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COGNITIVE VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT

The article studies the essence of scientific theory and scientific concept. It is clarified what the concept is and how it differs from other forms of holistic knowledge, and what criteria the concept must meet in order to be called scientific.

It was determined that the closest philosophical branch to science is the philosophy of science, as well as another discipline adjacent to linguistics – the philosophy of language. The philosophy of language is a research branch of philosophy that elucidates the role of language and speech in cognitive processes and structures of consciousness.

The role of methodology as a transitional type of intellectual activity that combines the subject-pragmatic nature of the philosophy of science and the object-argumentation nature of science is outlined. The first scientist who explicitly and unambiguously made linguistic research dependent on methodology was Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure did not use such a term, but spoke of «point of view».

It is proposed to consider the essence of scientific knowledge in the formation of methodically conceptualized and logically reasoned knowledge. And if the formal conceptualization of scientific knowledge concerns its existence as a theory or concept, then the essential conceptualization concerns the very nature of such knowledge, the degree of its objectivity or subjectivity. The essential aspect of scientific knowledge also reveals a relationship to nomotheticity or idiographicity in the understanding of the object and problem, and deductiveness or inductiveness of scientific analysis.

Methodological integrity and pragmatism are defined as the most essential characteristics of a scientific concept. The analysis of a scientific concept should consist, first, of understanding the methodological foundations on which it is built by the author of such a linguistic concept, in particular, his understanding of: the ontology of the researched object, the epistemology of linguistic research, the system of research methods. Only after that, the texts, individual utterances, statements, or remarks of the author of the scientific text, his followers or opponents, can be perceived adequately, and their critical assessments can acquire cognitive value.

Key words: *scientific knowledge, theory, concept, methodology, linguistics, ontology, epistemology.*

Formulation of the problem. Trying to answer the question to what extent this or that scientific thesis, this or that theoretical position, this or that method of argumentation can be attributed to some concept or theory, to what extent the listed scientific information functions are comparable or mutually consistent, after all – in what way this or that fragment of scientific text (original or translated) needs to be interpreted and why exactly in this way, it is necessary to focus on the problem of the essence of scientific concept as a whole cognitive space, as well as the essence and pragmafunctional features of its epistemological components – scientific theories, conceptual notions and judgments.

Theory is the most complex and developed form of scientific knowledge. It is preceded by other forms, such as programs, typologies, classifications, which form the basis for its formation. That is why theories arise on the basis of such programs (paradigms). Within such paradigms, the general basic provisions used in the theory are formulated, the boundaries of scientific reflection and organization of scientific knowledge, and its assessment, are provided. The commonality of these basic provisions is determined by the philosophical principles underlying scientific programs (paradigms). These programs function within the limits of the entire cultural and historical whole. Since the culture of society is not homogeneous, several scientific programs can be formulated within one cultural-historical whole. In turn, one scientific program usually gives rise to several scientific theories.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The closest philosophical branch to science is the philosophy of science, which emerged from philosophy in the second half of the 20th century as an independent philosophical branch and is sometimes considered by

researchers as "applied philosophy" [13, p. 114–115] or as a "theory of science" [9, p. 7]. One can hardly agree with the latter, since the subject of philosophical reflection is significantly dependent on the worldview guidelines of the philosopher, and its conclusions most often cannot be objectively verified. The views of those philosophers of science who describe this field of knowledge as "analytical epistemology" or "analytical philosophy" seem much more likely to us [17, p. 127], [21].

Adjacent to linguistics is another discipline – philosophy of language. Philosophy of language is a research branch of philosophy that elucidates the role of language and speech in cognitive processes and structures of consciousness. This is one of the key directions of research in modern analytical philosophy, which has become a certain special style of philosophical thinking, focused mainly on the problems of how to build theories and the principles of organizing linguistic means of expressing knowledge. Philosophers of language determine the ontological essence of language, the relationship between the sphere of language and reality, language and a human being, language and society, language and culture, or language and ethnos. At the same time, they have little interest in purely linguistic problems (for example, what language in relation to speech, memory or thinking is or what the difference between a sociolect and an idiolect is). Problems of ontology or epistemology of certain lingual functions (word, sentence, text, discourse) remain practically outside the sphere of interest of philosophers of language. Linguistics itself should study all these problems. But without defining the ontological essence of these phenomena, their linguistic research is absolutely impossible (see: [1]). A proper scientific or meta-scientific discipline is needed, which should study such problems. This is the methodology of linguistics.

The philosophy of language should not be confused not only with linguistics itself or its methodology, but also with other sciences that study language, for example, with the psychology of language (which is actively developed by V. Wundt and L. S. Vygotsky) or with the sociology of language (for example, in the works of G. Tarde).

Methodology as a science (or metascience) about the construction of human cognitive activity was set apart into a separate discipline at about the same time as the philosophy of science (in the second half of the 20th century). In our opinion, methodology is a transitional type of intellectual activity that combines the subject-pragmatic nature of the philosophy of science and the object-argumentative nature of science. The methodology is a set of basic guidelines for understanding: a) the ontology of the object of knowledge, i.e. "initial metascientific presumptions and beliefs about the nature of the object" [5, p. 69] (in linguistics, these are guidelines regarding the issues of language, speech and language experience), b) the epistemology of its research (how the linguist and the object of his knowledge are related, whether and how scientific knowledge of language, speech, language experience is possible), as well as c) methods of the research itself (in what ways to carry out linguistic cognitive procedures). A similar understanding of the essence of the methodology can be found in the works of D. V. Chernylevsky [22] and A. V. Mazak [14]. V. A. Glushchenko, in particular, draws attention to the ontological component of the methodology: "Ontology acts as a means by which the researcher perceives the world as a certain fragmented integrity presented to him in the system of philosophical categories" [3, p. 19]. At the same time, the scientist singles out the same three components of the methodology, calling them ontology, teleology, and the operational component, respectively: "The interpretation of the linguistic method as a complex logical unit, which includes ontological, operational, and teleological components, seems promising from the point of view of studying the units and categories of all language levels. The proposed approach makes it possible to combine such heterogeneous but interrelated phenomena as principles/approaches, operations (techniques, procedures) and the purpose of research into a holistic concept of the method" [ibid., p. 20]. I. O. Golubovska is absolutely right, who believes that the methodological factor «should act as the leading factor in the selection of this or that «paradigm» [5, p. 69].

Problem statement. In the center of our attention is the scientific concept in its historical (mostly retrospective) reception by supporters and opponents, its cognitive value. So, it is necessary to answer two basic questions. First, what a concept is and how it differs from other forms of holistic knowledge, and secondly, what criteria a concept should meet in order to be called scientific.

Presentation of the main material. Theory is the most complex and developed form of scientific knowledge. It is preceded by other forms, such as programs, typologies, classifications, which form the basis for its formation. That is why theories arise on the basis of such programs (paradigms). Within such paradigms, the general basic provisions used in the theory are formulated, the boundaries of scientific reflection and organization of scientific knowledge,

and its assessment, are provided. The commonality of these basic provisions is determined by the philosophical principles underlying scientific programs (paradigms). These programs function within the limits of the entire cultural and historical whole. Since the culture of society is not homogeneous, several scientific programs can be formulated within one cultural-historical whole. In turn, one scientific program usually gives rise to several scientific theories.

The description of the structure of a scientific theory can be presented from both a substantive and a formal point of view. A meaningful, essential basic aspect belongs to the very nature of knowledge (the degree of objectivity-subjectivity) – to what extent scientific knowledge can be objective or subjective. The word subjective was significantly compromised by objectivist methodologists. In their understanding, this is synonymous with false, random and unproven knowledge. The same thing happened with the word objective. According to anthropocentrists, this is synonymous with hypostasis, a fiction that cannot be scientifically verified. In order to avoid these connotations, it is better to use the pair subjective (knowledge about the subject) – objective (knowledge about the object) in the anthropocentric paradigm. Under such a condition, information about the positioning and truth of knowledge becomes irrelevant. Knowledge is always relative, we seek to learn not about how things «really» are, but to gain knowledge that enables us to rationally explain and organize human experience. If in the system-centric approach, which is oriented towards the ideal of a single positive knowledge, the linguist, objectively describing and studying language laws, is, according to the ideal and idealized research model, outside the language, then the anthropocentric approach assumes a look at the language from the inside, and therefore the relationship researcher – language is built on other foundations» [24, p. 8]. The essential aspect also concerns such characteristics of scientific knowledge as nomotheticity or idiographicity in understanding the object and problem, deductiveness or inductiveness of the analysis.

But more interesting is the analysis of the theory from the formal side. The formal basic aspect is related to the form of existence of scientific knowledge (as theories or concepts, which include postulates, theses, a system of concepts, a system of argumentation and proof, scientific facts, methodological principles), and here we include the problems of the limits of scientific knowledge, primarily methodology (included or not included in a concept or theory). Subjective and intentional theory (theory of something) – «systematically presented grid of invariants of various levels of abstraction» [19, p. 25], the concept is subjective and intentional (someone's concept or the concept of some school, trend).

Within a concept, it is not always easy to separate objective knowledge from subjective one, that is, to separate what concerns the very subject of research (language, speech, utterances, sounds, morphemes, models, texts) from subjective information about the position of the author of the concept. These aspects of the concept are closely intertwined, moreover, which Saussure himself particularly insisted on, the first largely depends on the second. This becomes a problem for historical-linguistic research, on the one hand, and for inter-conceptual discussions about certain objects of research, on the other. Often, the conceptual differences are so significant that due to the homonymy of the terms, disputes become completely pointless (disputes about different objects or disputes about words). It is even more difficult to reconcile theories that are historically distant from each other, since the objects nominated by traditional terms were significantly reinterpreted during the evolution of science and could be interpreted differently (sometimes radically differently) in various schools and directions.

It is worth starting the analysis of these problems with distinguishing between scientific and practical (utilitarian) knowledge (information). This distinguishing can be effectively implemented on a pragmatic basis[1], because from a semantic (thematic) or formal (linguistic, in particular) points of view, scientific information verbalized in the text may not fundamentally differ from practical-utilitarian information. If you focus on linguistic topics, the best examples here can be monographs (or scientific papers), university textbooks (or language guides), popular scientific texts and language examinations (in particular, forensic ones). Only the first ones aim at knowledge in its sociocultural and civilizational aspects. A textbook, a popular scientific paper in a glossy magazine, or an expert assessment are not intended to introduce any fundamentally new information into the sociocultural picture of the world. Their task is purely practical: to spread already created and proven (better or worse) knowledge among the interested public (a popular scientific work), future specialists (a didactic work), or to solve a specific practical (legal, economic or social) problem with the help of such scientific knowledge. Such knowledge (as personalized or socialized information) can arise only within the limits of scientific and cognitive activity and scientific discourse.

[1] The theoretical basis of our analysis of the specificity of scientific information is primarily the work of the Ukrainian-Polish linguist and methodologist O. V. Leszczak [26].

What else, apart from basic pragmatics, can be the difference between actually scientific and utilitarian-practical information? The semantics and form of such texts can be very similar. Both scientific text and didactic one (especially university text) can be equally rational and logical, saturated with scientific concepts and terminology. However, a significant difference between them emerges when we analyze them from the point of view of the structure of socialization of information and the discursive strategy used in the process of their creation. A utilitarian-practical text should, firstly, be communicative (aimed at its comprehensibility for the recipient), and therefore, secondly, be highly conventional (based on the linguosemiotic principles generally accepted in a certain field of activity). In contrast, a scientific text, which is a product of cognitive creativity, must first of all be expressive (expressiveness is understood according to the Prague school as a function of expressing intention along with a communicative function as a function of social interaction), and secondly, be coherent. Both of these features create a significant obstacle to the perception of scientific information not only by a person far from science, but often by scientists as well, because the task of a scientist is not to satisfy the curiosity of the future reader and not even to inform his fellow scientists about his discovery, but primarily to express his/her thoughts and conclusions in verbal and textual form. Hence the need to develop specific conceptual and discursive methods of interpreting a scientific text. What has been said implies another socio-cultural aspect of the fundamental difference between scientific and utilitarian-practical texts. A scientific text is always created for other scientists, moreover, the more innovative the text, the narrower the circle of people to whom it is addressed. An expert text is written so that it can be understood by every specialist in this field, a didactic text is oriented to everyone who studies at this educational level, and a popular science (in particular, encyclopedic) text is oriented to everyone who is interested in a certain problem in a non-professional way.

Another point that can and should be paid attention to when outlining the specifics of a scientific text and scientific information is the difference between scientific information and philosophical-worldview information. It is often difficult to distinguish scientific work (especially in the field of humanities or social sciences, especially theoretical or fundamental work, as well as interdisciplinary one) from philosophical work (especially if it is the work on ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of society, politics, or philosophy of language). However, the fluid nature of human cultural and informational activity does not mean that science and philosophy do not fundamentally differ. As in the previous case, the difference lies precisely in the pragmatics of information creation and the way of its socialization. In this case, it would be appropriate to turn to the concept of the Polish sociocybernetic scientist Marian Mazur [27], who proposed the following scheme of distinguishing between science, philosophy and art (three basic branches of the virtual sphere of human experience): according to the criterion of generalization and systematization of information used, science and philosophy are fundamentally differ from art, which always operates with specific information and does not try to create a coherent, deductively structured system of the picture of the world, instead, by the criterion of argumentation, science is fundamentally different from both art and philosophy (see [25, c. 13–15]). A scientist must logically and methodically argue the provisions of his/her concept or theory and must prove his theses speculatively or empirically (therefore, his work must contain both generalizing statements and argumentative procedures). A philosopher or an artist does not have such an obligation, therefore the former usually lacks an argumentative base, and the latter has neither statements nor arguments. M. Mazur distinguishes three types of statements, respectively – scientific theses (in which information is presented as true or false and confirmed by proving its veracity), philosophical assurances (in which information is presented as true without proper proof of its veracity) and artistic revelations (in which information is presented as having no relation to truth or falsity, and therefore as not to be confirmed).

In addition, a philosopher, unlike a scientist, is not so much interested in knowledge as such (in its relationship with other knowledge or the world of experience), but rather in experiencing the moment of cognition, as well as assessing the value of the acquired knowledge, giving it axiological significance. Using linguistic terms, we can say that the scientist is interested in the content (meaning) and rational sense of the text, and the philosopher is interested in the cultural and civilizational significance of the sense and its value for human life. This leaves an imprint on the philosophical text. It is rarely logically structured, terminologically and conceptually consistent, almost never specialized, often highly individualized (due to evaluativity), and almost always appeals to the recipient's emotions, beliefs and faith.

Philosophical information should captivate and encourage the subject to define his/her relationship to the world. Scientific information, on the other hand,

should provide moderately detached knowledge about the world. Even if in both cases the object of reflection is a person (as such or as a thinking individual), philosophical reflection focuses on the subjective characteristics of information, while scientific reflection focuses on its objective features. A philosopher should not distance himself from the object of his thoughts, does not seek to free himself from his attitude to the object, while a scientist, on the contrary, looks for methods of such a separation and liberation. That is why scientific theories and philosophical doctrines, and concepts cannot be confused.

Of course, taking into account the heterogeneity of sciences (usually in Slavic language cultures they speak of natural and technical and humanitarian and social sciences, in the English-speaking world – about science and arts, and in the French-speaking world – about science et lettres) and the typological nature of the understanding of human cultural experience, it can be asserted that the sciences aimed at the knowledge of the natural world are more different from philosophy than the sciences whose object is the world of a human being as such, as a personality or as a member of society, and therefore the world of human relations. Linguistics, without a doubt, belongs to such sciences, because languages and their implementation in speech acts are purely informational functions that do not exist outside the human psyche and interpersonal relations. The only actual material (physical) manifestations of language activity, which are the objects of linguistics – speech sounds, are actually of interest to linguists not as such, but only as products of articulation or acoustic stimuli, the physical quality of which has an insignificant effect on the essence of the speech act as a procedure of signal exchange of information. Actually, the linguistic object is not them, but language and speech meanings (lexical, grammatical, stylistic, discursive) and acoustic and articulatory functions adjacent to them (acoustic impressions, articulatory models, phonemes, etc.). Bypassing the discussion of the extent to which the natural sciences are free from the information capabilities and actions of the subject (it is enough to mention here the famous Heisenberg principle or the recently fashionable anthropic principle), it can be said simplistically that the natural and technical sciences study (tend to study) mainly material objects, instead, social and humanitarian ones (in particular, linguistics) – information.

The methodology is especially important for those sciences whose object is not directly empirically given (is not a physical, material object). Undoubtedly, linguistics belongs to such sciences. The first scientist who explicitly and unambiguously made linguistic research dependent on methodology was Ferdinand de Saussure (although he did not use such a term yet but spoke of «point of view»). All his predecessors (F. Bopp, V. von Humboldt, A. Schleicher, G. Steinthal or A. Leskin) to one degree or another focused on finding methods of non-relational cognition of the linguistic object, which they tried to «liberate» as much as possible from a human being – carrier. «Objective» knowledge of language as the historical spirit of a people, as the cultural psychology of an ethnos, or as an innate psychophysiological function of an organism required the processing of not only various methods of material analysis and data conceptualization, but also completely different methodological grounds for such analysis and conceptualization. Saussure was the first to understand this dependence. Together with I. Beaudoin de Courtenay, M. V. Krushevsky, O. O. Potebna (and several other anthropocentric linguists), he not only ontologically conceptualized language as a psychosocial function of human activity, but also outlined this position as a methodological basis for research. The dependence of language/speech on the experience/activity of a person, and the cognition of language activity on the methodological instructions of a linguist clearly relativized linguistics and forced subsequent generations of linguists, on the one hand, to realize their meta-reflexive position regarding the object, and on the other hand, to realize the need to develop more flexible methods of studying language experience precisely as a human (in particular, one's own) activity. If we agree with the widespread thesis that Saussure was the creator of modern linguistics and the «father» of structuralism, then there is only one thing: without a doubt, linguistics of the 20th century (and above all structuralism in all its manifestations) became distinctly methodological. Before Saussure, so much time and space in linguistic studies was never devoted to clarifying one's methodological position and to methodological discussions with opponents. In this sense, Saussure can be considered the founder of a qualitatively new paradigm in linguistics. After him, it is no longer accepted to ignore the role of the linguist in linguistic studies and to perceive the object of this science as given and independent of the researcher [16].

It is possible to refute the position of Saussure, who believed that a specific feature of linguistics itself is a methodological feature: «in the field of linguistics, the connection that we establish between objects precedes these objects and serves to define them. In other areas of science, there are predetermined things, objects that can then be viewed from different points of view. We

have, first of all, points of view, true or false, but always only points of view, and objects are created with their help. These created objects correspond to reality if the starting point turns out to be true, and do not correspond to it in the opposite case; but in both cases nothing, not a single object is given to us even for a moment by itself. This is true even when it comes to the material fact itself, which would seem to be predetermined with all clarity, such as, for example, the sequence of pronounced sounds» [18, c. 110].

In such a statement, one can see a kind of scientific modesty and a certain methodological minimalism. Saussure may not have wanted to comment on other sciences, but perhaps he was convinced that only the linguistic object does not have a substantial character (it is a relationship between conceptual and phonetic information). But from today's standpoint, it can already be asserted that Saussure's phrase applies equally to all humanities and social sciences, in which the object of research is not physical objects and their mechanical relations (which can be sensed to a greater or lesser extent), namely informational relations, that exist in the form of mental functions, to which there is no direct access, and the study of which requires preliminary elaboration of the research methodology, that is, it is impossible without preliminary elaboration of the «point of view». Linguists and theoreticians of science in general have always been aware that conflicts and disputes between representatives of various currents and directions in linguistics are based primarily on differences in methodological and philosophical (worldview) bases of research [7; 8; 12; 15; 20; 23]. However, linguistic methodology is increasingly becoming a subject of independent study and is recognized as a necessary element of every linguistic study (see works: [2; 4; 10; 11]).

Conclusions. The essence of scientific knowledge consists primarily in the formation of methodically conceptualized and logically argued knowledge. The formal conceptualization of scientific knowledge refers to its existence as a theory or concept. Substantial conceptualization, on the other hand, concerns the very nature of such knowledge, in particular, the degree of its objectivity or subjectivity. The essential aspect of scientific knowledge reveals a relationship also to nomotheticity or idiographicity in the understanding of the object and problem, and deductiveness or inductiveness of scientific analysis. The most important characteristics of the scientific concept are methodological integrity and pragmatism. Linguistic concept is a holistic picture of the understanding of language, the linguistic sphere of reality or linguistic experience, based on a certain scientific and methodological outlook, while linguistic theory is a purely scientific construction aimed at describing and/or explaining certain entities, phenomena, processes, and relations.

Therefore, the analysis of a scientific concept should consist primarily of understanding the methodological foundations on which it is built, that is, a set of conceptual notions (a), precedent judgments (b) and conceptually relevant models of scientific thinking (c), combined into a functional and pragmatic informational whole. The next step is to understand the very methodology of the author of the linguistic concept, in particular his understanding of: the ontology of the object under research, the epistemology of linguistic research, as well as the system of research methods used by the author. Only after that, the texts, individual statements, statements, or remarks of the author of the scientific text, his followers or opponents, can be perceived adequately, and their critical assessments can acquire cognitive value.

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Просяник О. П., Тарасенко С. Є. ПІЗНАВАЛЬНА ЦІННІСТЬ НАУКОВОЇ КОНЦЕПЦІЇ

У статті досліджено сутність наукової теорії і наукової концепції. З'ясовано, що таке концепція і чим вона відрізняється від інших форм цілісного знання, та яким критеріям має відповідати концепція, щоб її можна було назвати науковою.

Визначено що найближчою до науки філософською галуззю є філософія науки, так само як суміжна з мовознавством ще одна дисципліна – філософія мови. Філософія мови – дослідницька галузь філософії, котра з'ясовує роль мови й мовлення в пізнавальних процесах і структурах свідомості.

Окреслено роль методології як перехідного типу інтелектуальної діяльності, що поєднує суб'єктно-прагматичний характер філософії науки й об'єктно-аргументаційний характер науки. Першим науковцем, хто експліцитно й однозначно узалежнив лінгвістичне дослідження від методології, був Фердинанд де Соссюр. Соссюр не вживав такого терміна, а говорив про «точку зору».

Запропоновано розглядати сутність наукового пізнання у формуванні методично концептуалізованого й логічно аргументованого знання. І якщо формальна концептуалізація наукового знання стосується його існування як теорії або концепції, то сутнісна концептуалізація стосується самого характеру такого знання, ступеня його об'єктивності чи суб'єктивності. Сутнісний аспект наукового пізнання виявляє стосунок також до номотетичності чи ідіографічності в розумінні об'єкта й проблеми, та дедуктивності чи індуктивності проведення наукового аналізу.

Методологічну цілісність і прагматичність визначено як найістотніші характеристики наукової концепції. Аналіз наукової концепції має полягати насамперед на розумінні методологічних засад, на яких вона побудована автором такої лінгвістичної концепції, зокрема розуміння ним: онтології досліджуваного об'єкта, епістемології лінгвістичного дослідження, системи дослідницьких методик. Лише після цього тексти, окремі висловлювання, ствердження чи зауваження самого автора наукового тексту, його послідовників чи опонентів, можуть бути сприйняті адекватно, а їхні критичні оцінки – набути пізнавальної вартості.

Ключові слова: *наукове пізнання, теорія, концепція, методологія, лінгвістика, онтологія, епістемологія.*