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UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: A REVIEW OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ITS ROOT CAUSES

РОЗУМІННЯ КОНФЛІКТІВ В АФРИЦІ: ОГЛЯД ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНОЇ НЕСТАБІЛЬНОСТІ ТА ЇЇ ОСНОВНИХ ПРИЧИН

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***Abstract.** Currently, Africa remains a specific region characterized by high tensions stemming from various intra-state uprisings and inter-state conflicts. The roots of this situation lie in political instability, economic inequality, and the social fragmentation of the population, which has a long history. The diversity of ethnicities, religious movements, and colonial experiences on this continent have often served as a basis for deepening social divisions and the passage of violent clashes.*

In recent decades, the conflict situation has been further complicated by the growing influence of non-state actors on the continent, external intervention by economically developed states, and the intensification of competition for natural resources at the global level. These factors have become drivers of the intensification of existing tensions in the region.

By examining the main drivers of instability - from governance deficits and economic isolation to ethnic resentments and environmental problems, this study aims to develop a holistic understanding of the specifics of conflicts in Africa. Particular attention is paid to how contemporary challenges, such as international geopolitical rivalry and resource scarcity, intersect with traditional sources of tension, making conventional conflict resolution mechanisms increasingly ineffective.

The study found that resolving African conflicts requires a paradigm shift from isolated sectoral interventions to comprehensive, synergistic strategies that simultaneously address the root causes in political, economic and social aspects. For example, the joint infrastructure program of the European Union and the African Union worth €750 million demonstrates how infrastructure and economic integration can function as tools for building peace and stability.

There are a large number of similar initiatives, such as the African Union Agenda 2063, which envisages the development of African countries to transform the region into a peaceful and prosperous one, but their implementation is hampered by insufficient investment and protracted conflicts.

Keywords: *African conflict, resource-based conflicts, governance in Africa, regional integration, security-development nexus, post-colonial Africa, geopolitical instability.*

Анотація. *В теперішній час Африка залишається специфічним регіоном, який характеризується високою напруженістю, яка походить із різноманітних внутрішньодержавних повстань та міждержавних конфліктів. Коріння такої ситуації походять з політичної нестабільності, економічної нерівності та соціальної фрагментації населення, що має багатовікову історію. Розмаїття етнічних приналежностей, релігійних течій і колоніального досвіду на цьому континенті часто слугувало основою для поглиблення соціальних розбіжностей і проходження насильницьких зіткнень.*

В останні десятиліття конфліктна ситуація ще більше ускладнилася зростанням впливу недержавних акторів на країни континенту, зовнішнім втручанням економічно розвинених держав і загостренням конкуренції за природні ресурси на світовому рівні. Зазначені фактори стали драйверами посилення існуючої напруженості в регіоні.

Вивчаючи основні чинники нестабільності - від дефіциту управління та економічної ізоляції до етнічних образ і екологічних проблем це дослідження спрямоване на формування цілісного розуміння особливостей конфліктів в Африці. Особлива увага приділяється тому, як сучасні виклики, такі як міжнародне геополітичне суперництво та ресурсна нестача, перетинаються з традиційними джерелами напруги, роблячи звичайні механізми вирішення конфліктів дедалі неефективними.

В рамках проведеного дослідження було встановлено, що розв'язання африканських конфліктів потребує зміни парадигми від ізольованих секторальних втручань до комплексних синергетичних стратегій, які одночасно усувають першопричини в політичному, економічному та соціальному аспектах. Наприклад, спільна інфраструктурна програма Європейського Союзу та Африканського Союзу вартістю 750 мільйонів євро демонструє, як інфраструктурна та економічна інтеграція можуть функціонувати в якості інструментів для розбудови миру та стабільності. Існує велика кількість схожих ініціатив, наприклад Порядок денний Африканського Союзу на період до 2063 року, який передбачає розвиток африканських країн для перетворення регіону в мирний і процвітаючий, але їх реалізації заважають недостатність інвестицій та тривалі конфлікти.

Ключові слова: *африканські конфлікти, ресурсні конфлікти, регіональна інтеграція, зв'язок безпеки та розвитку, постколоніальна Африка, геополітична нестабільність.*

Introduction. Africa is the most conflict-prone geopolitical region in the world, plagued with recurring patterns of violent conflicts encompassing both intrastate insurgencies and interstate conflicts. Such broad insecurity is an entrenched state shaped by an interaction of historical, political, economic, as well as social determinants. Africa is marked with an immensely complex mosaic of religions, ethnic groups, and colonial history, often used as fault lines for conflict. In modern times, the rise of non-state actors, pursuit of natural resources, as well as intervention by international great powers, have acted as additional drivers of region-wide tensions.

These conflicts have far-reaching impacts on state-building and internal development within African countries while at the same time presenting global peace and security with existential challenges. Humanitarian crises, mass displacement, and armed groups as well as extremist ideologies are inherent threats that compromise national borders. Examining conflicts in Africa in this regard becomes pertinent as well as imperative. By understanding the causes and dynamics of

conflicts as well as the means of resolving them, useful insights can be derived for the challenges as well as possibilities for peace in Africa.

Purpose of the study. The objective of this study was to examine the underlying causes of conflict in Africa.

Literature review. The question of the roots of Africa's conflict has been the subject of research by various scholars. Many studies point to the colonial past as a major source of modern instability, notably the creation of arbitrary borders and institutional frameworks that still define political and social problems today. Shola Lawal draws attention to the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, where European powers arbitrarily divided the continent, disregarding ethnic and cultural realities – thereby laying the groundwork for enduring political fragmentation (Lawal, 2025). Similarly, Adedotun Oyeniyi explores how colonial-era borders continue to fuel tensions, particularly by institutionalizing divisions that still manifest in modern governance struggles (Oyeniyi & Oyeniyi, 2024).

Governance and institutional fragility are consistent themes in the literature. The African Development Bank's African Development Institute identifies limited institutional capacity as a persistent barrier to inclusive development and effective conflict resolution, especially in the post-COVID context (African Development Bank & African Development Bank Group, 2021). Ambassador Professor Bitange Ndemo extends this critique by tracing the roots of poor governance and social inequality back to colonial rule, arguing that structural injustices were inherited and perpetuated in post-independence governance systems (Ndemo, 2024).

Security-focused literature highlights the regionalization and escalation of violence, especially in areas where state authority is weak or contested. Clionadh Raleigh documents the increasingly complex nature of African conflict, involving state and non-state actors across interlinked theatres of violence (Raleigh, n.d.).

The Sahel is also quite a transnational extremism hotbed, and the Sahel region alone will be responsible for over half of all terrorism-related fatalities in 2024, a worrisome trend, according to Sheriff Bojang Jnr (Jnr, 2025).

This protracted security crisis has generated questions about whether international military interventions can yield results. The Economist explains that French counterterrorism in the Sahel won prestigious victories in the short term, but in the long run, has not achieved sustainable security (The Economist, 2022). Like Yuan Zhu and Wannan Gao, they question the strategic logic of U.S. military engagement, positing that external actors have too frequently failed to align themselves with local socio-political contexts or establish sustainable conditions (Zhu & Gao, 2024). In contrast, other analysts call for redirecting efforts to bottom-up peacebuilding strategies, relegating top-down imposition to a secondary status behind bottom-up outreach.

Natural resources are another critical factor in conflict dynamics. Jean-Yves Kamale and Mark Banchereau describe how mineral wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo has become deeply entangled in violence and international competition (Kamale & Banchereau, 2025).

The Panzi Foundation emphasizes the devastating human toll of resource-fuelled conflict – particularly for women – highlighting the need for regulatory frameworks that prioritize human security over-extraction (Panzi Foundation, 2025).

Environmental drivers are increasingly viewed as conflict magnifiers. According to Melinda Jones, when in the Sahel environmental deterioration and overcrowding lead to resource shortages and relocation, and the potential for violence increases (Dlewis, 2024). These environmental pressures are often compounded by socioeconomic vulnerabilities – illustrating the multidimensional nature of instability.

In establishing legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate continental integration as well as conflict avoidance, legal and institutional structures such as the African Union's Peace and Security Council and the Agenda 2063 are sought. Yet, implementation remains uneven and many programs lack adequate support and accountability at local levels (The Peace & Security, n.d.; African Union, n.d.).

While these systems have massive sources of information, it is full of holes and contradictions in it. Global interventions are being cited as stabilizing measures, albeit their value in the long term has been questioned.

While these operations might dismantle the networks of extremists, they fail to deal with most of the causes of the conflict – poor institutions, inequality, and exclusion. In the same vein, as development aid is advocated on all sides, concerns are raised about whether such efforts empower domestic institutions or rather entrench dependency and elite capture.

Moreover, many studies isolate individual conflict drivers, be it colonial legacies, economic disparity, or climate stress, without examining how these drivers intersect. There is also a notable lack of empirical input from conflict-affected communities themselves, which limits the relevance and applicability of many high-level policy assessments. These constraints mirror a compartmentalized perception of African conflict processes, emphasizing the need for more holistic, context-specific, and community-focused approaches to research.

Considered collectively, these findings highlight the necessity for an overall understanding of violence in Africa, one that not only diagnoses its aetiology but also shapes locally generated paths to peace and stability. This study aims to contribute to these efforts.

Results. The continent's rich African cultural and ethnic diversity was not taken into account when European powers divided Africa in the late 19th century. The best example of such a strategy was the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 during which colonial borders were mapped out to further imperial aims, generally separating together unifocal ethnic groups and joining diverse areas. As an example, the Somalis have been cut off from Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, sowing seeds of future conflict. Random boundaries have also promoted ethnic strife and separatist movements in sub-independence Africa (Oyenyi & Oyenyi, 2024).

Colonial governments promoted the extraction of Africa's natural resources to fund non-public commercial growth, establishing financial structures that were heavily reliant on raw material exports. This emphasis on positive resource extraction has impeded the growth of various African economies, leaving many countries in the region subject to global market volatility and perpetuating monetary dependencies that persist to the present day.

Africa's rapid transition to independence in the mid-20th century sometimes resulted in unstable political systems. The inherited colonial structures were unprepared to deal with the problems of governing in varied communities, making it difficult to construct efficient and inclusive national apparatuses. This institutional weak point has frequently manifested in political instability and governance crises (Ndemo, 2024).

In the submit-independence generation, many African nations experienced prolonged authoritarian rule and navy interventions (Table 1).

Table 1. Authoritarian regimes in post-independence Africa

Country	Leader(s) of authoritarian regimes	Time period
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	1960-1966
Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed	1966-1976
Uganda	Idi Amin	1971-1979
Zaire (DRC)	Mobutu Sese Seko	1965-1997
Ethiopia	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1987-1991
Libya	Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi	1969-2011
Sudan	Gaafar Nimeiry	1969-1985
Somalia	Siad Barre	1969-1991
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1987-2017

Created by the authors based on (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 1998a), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 1998b), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025a), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025b), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025c), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025d), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025e), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025f), (The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2025g) and (Central Bank of Nigeria, n.d)

The absence of well-established democratic norms, coupled with the difficulties of establishing cohesive nations within states created arbitrarily, helped bring about governments that often focused on maintaining authority rather than on democratic rule. This pattern has significantly impacted political progress and civil liberties throughout the region (Lawal, 2025).

Over the last few decades, African wars have gained a massive scale nature, encompassing various regions of the continent and having various reasons – ethnic, religious, political, and resource-based (Table. 2).

Table. 2. Major contemporary conflicts in Africa: causes, actors, and countries

Country	Cause of Conflict	Time Period	Main Actors
Nigeria	Ethnic & Religious conflict	Ongoing (2024)	Boko Haram, Islamic State in West Africa Province, Christian communities
Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger	Political unrest & military coups	2020s– Present	Military juntas, ECOWAS, civil society groups
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resource struggle, armed factions	Ongoing	Over 100 armed groups, local militias
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger	Jihadist insurgency, ethnic polarization	Intensified 2024	Jihadist groups, local ethnic militias
Ethiopia	Ethnopolitical conflict, post-war instability	Post-2018	Ethnic militias, federal government, other regional actors
Somalia	Extremism, clan disintegration, weak political institutions	Ongoing	Al-Shabaab, clan-based factions, political institutions
Central African Region (DRC focus)	Resource-based conflict, international mining interests	Ongoing	Armed groups, U.S. partners, mining firms

Created by the authors based on (Brooke-Holland, 2025), (Panzi Foundation, 2025), (Jnr, 2025), (Lewis, Donati, & Kang, 2024), (Center for Preventive Action, 2025), (Minority Rights Group, 2025), (Kamale, & Banchereau, 2025)

Ethnic and religious conflicts serve as regular generators of violence – in Nigeria, terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province carry out selective strikes against Christian populations leading to conditions of mass displacement and humanitarian crises (Fox News, 2024). Political unrest tends to result in civil war and military coup d'etats, as seen primarily in West Africa, in particular, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This has compromised democratic institutions and regional equilibrium, prompting ECOWAS to sanction

and resort to diplomatic action (Brooke-Holland, 2025). Another prevalent kind of conflict is resource struggle land, water, minerals. The retention by some groups of armed factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo adds a further complication by the lack of resources in using them as a means to finance their operations, which is eventually working against fulfilling national stability (Panzi Foundation, 2025).

The destabilization in some areas is particularly severe. Jihadist organizations are very active in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and interethnic conflict is getting worse. 51% of all terrorism-related fatalities worldwide occurred in this region in 2024. The proliferation of transnational jihadist ideologies, security force abuses, and ethnic polarization have all contributed to the conflict (Jnr, 2025). Militant organizations quickly filled the security void left by the exit of Western military forces, especially the French (Lewis et al., 2024).

Most of the Horn of Africa conflicts are ethnopolitical. There is a conflict from within in Ethiopia where various ethnic groups vie to grab power and authority. Despite the fact that the war with Eritrea was announced as concluded in 2018, the effects can be experienced within the region up to this moment (Center for Preventive Action, 2025). Al-Shabaab and such extremist groups have spread within Somalia because of clan disintegration and weak political institutions (Minority Rights Group, 2025).

Central Africa is wracked by conflicts stemming largely from competition for natural resources. There are over 100 armed groups active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, primarily in the eastern parts of the country. International initiatives, including talks with the United States over the development of cobalt and gold reserves, have not stabilized the security situation, which remains very volatile (Kamale & Banchereau, 2025).

For a deeper understanding of the nature of these conflicts, it is worth paying attention to their drivers (Fig.3).



Fig. 3. Main drivers of conflict development in Africa. Created by the authors based on (Bariyo, 2025), (Tumanjon, 2024), (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, n.d.), (Businessamlive, 2019), (Aduku A. Akubo, & Benjamin Ikani Okolo, 2019), (World Bank Open Data, n.d.), (Ecofin Agency, n.d.), (Ward, & Dawsey, 2025), (Zhu, & Gao, 2024)

As pointed out above the colonial history of Africa created multinational states that included various ethnic and religious groups within arbitrary borders. This fracturing has all too often resulted in tension and violence, as in South Sudan, where political divisions between President Salva Kiir and his deputy, Riek Machar, have morphed into ethnic slaughter between the Dinka and Nuer peoples (Bariyo & Bol/Reuters, 2025).

The prevalence of corruption, poor rule of law, and lack of territorial control undermine governance and foster public distrust. Corruption in Mali, for example, affects several domains, including defence and resource extraction (Tumanjong, 2024). Scandals involving misuse of military funds and bribery for mining rights underscore the extent of corruption, which fuels instability and impedes progress toward development goals (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre n.d.).

High youth marginalization and unemployment rates are threats for the aggravated tensions inside the society. Since one of Africa's top economies, some 35% of its people reside in miserable poverty (Businesslive, 2019). Groups like Boko Haram are exploiting the economic disparity to recruit disillusioned youths and despoil the region (Aduku A. Akubo, Benjamin Ikani Okolo, 2019, December 5.). The rapid rise in population, combined with the limited resources, increases competition for the essentials. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a case in point, with large segments of its population suffering from poverty in extreme form. This means that the demand for resources causes social instability and stagnates progress. And it is not only internal dynamics that matter, major global players have ramped up their activities within Africa (World Bank, 2024; World Bank Open Data, n.d.).

As major arms providers, Russian Federation and China continue to supply numerous African nations with military equipment. Both Russian Federation and China have emerged as large-scale suppliers of arms to most African countries. In combination, they provided 39% of the arms imported into Africa from 2020-2024, with each Russian Federation and China supplying 21% and 18%, respectively (Ecofin Agency, n.d.). These are facts that only point to increased geopolitical stakes both these countries presently hold in the continent. What's more is the United States' fervent efforts at getting hold of essential minerals that remain integral to the requirements of the military and industrial spheres. Washington has been conducting diplomacy with a view to securing mining concessions. This has included the provision of financial and military aid to states like the Democratic Republic of Congo, in exchange for favorable resource terms (Ward & Dawsey, 2025).

In 2014, France began Operation Barkhane to tackle Islamist insurgency in the Sahel (The Economist, 2022). However, it began removing soldiers from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2022, citing a wave of military coups and growing public hostility to French participation (BBC News, 2023). The United States has persisted meanwhile with counterterror operations like operation Juniper Shield, which attacks terror groups in the Sahara and Sahel (Zhu & Gao, 2024). In spite of the reverses, including the ouster of US Marines from Niger, Washington has relocated its military resources from coastal West African countries such as Benin and Ivory Coast to reinforce its counterterror operations (Phillips et al., 2024).

Russian Federation has deepened its engagement by providing military aid to Sahelian military juntas-ruled nations. In April 2025, it proposed assisting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in establishing a shared army to fight Islamist insurgencies, such as the provision of contemporary kit and training (Reuters, 2025 b). The European Union has also maintained a presence, with missions like as EUCAP Somalia focused at improving marine security and the rule of law (European External Action Service, 2025). The mandate of EUCAP was extended in December 2024 to February 2027 (Council of the European Union, 2024).

Despite a 44% decrease in Africa's overall arms imports from 2020 to 2024 compared to the previous five-year period, the international arms trade – both through formal channels and illicit markets – also continues to fuel conflict and instability across various regions of the continent (defenceWeb, 2025). The consequences of long-term conflicts in Africa are presented in Fig. 4.

Long-term conflicts throughout Africa have created dire food shortages, mass displacement and humanitarian crises. By September 2024 there were more than 378,000 internally displaced people in Mali, 86% of them women and children escaping the violence (Mali, 2024). The conflicts in South Sudan and Sudan have led to their food systems being extremely destabilized, with very high levels of food insecurity in both nations, which are “hunger hotspots”. The humanitarian crisis is added to by outbreaks of disease that have broken out in areas of conflict (Zampano, 2024).

Besides, prolonged conflicts led to the degradation of basic infrastructure, deterred investment, and slowed down economic development. The overall investment rate in Africa has been steadily declining since 1975, indicating that the generalized slump in investment has bitten hard into economic development (Artadi & Sala-I-Martin, 2003). Conflicts led to environmental degradation, inducing desertification and land degradation. Burkina Faso has lost over nine million hectares of once fertile land in the Sahel, and further degradation is imminent (Dlewis, 2024). Environmental changes push forward a vicious cycle of hardship by creating food insecurity and forcing people to leave their homes (Ahmadnia, Christien, Spencer, Hart, & De Araujo Barbosa, 2022).




Fig.4. The consequences of long-term conflicts in Africa. Created by the authors based on (defenceWeb,2025) (Mali, 2024), (Zampano,2024), (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003) (Ahmadnia, et. al.2022), (Lederer, 2023) (Lewis, Donati, & Kang, 2024), (Center for Preventive Action, 2024)

War-related environmental damage through natural resource depletion obstructs recovery initiatives and simultaneously creates conditions for continued conflict. Moreover, the recent period has seen a rapid expansion of violent extremist groups. In Mali, the Islamic State nearly doubled its territorial control within a year, capitalizing on stalled peace processes and ongoing violence (Lederer, 2023).

West Africa is now a hotspot for terrorism with al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated jihadist movements having increased their presence, resulting in additional displacement and fatalities (Lewis et al., 2024). Humanitarian crises have intensified throughout the continent, and whole regions have been destabilised because of the persistence of extremist networks, primarily within the Sahel. The breakdown of global counterterrorism initiatives and the collapse of regional countermovements created a power vacuum that violent extremism has since occupied (Center for Preventive Action, 2024).

African Union Peace and Security Council has been at the forefront of conflict prevention and resolution in the African region (The Peace & Security, n.d.; African Union, n.d.). Good evidence for successful mediation in action in April of 2025 would have seen the involvement of AU mediators such as former Burundi president Domitien Ndayizeye, as well as Kenyan judge Effie Owuor, traveling to South Sudan's capital, Juba, in an effort at mediating talks aimed at preventing renewed civil war following the house arrest of First Vice-President Riek Machar. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the region's bodies were quick in acting as well (Reuters, 2025 a). Southern African Development Community as well as the East African Community widened their list of mediators in March of 2025 in an effort at ending the growing crisis of the M23 insurgency and appointed five ex-presidents such as Olusegun Obasanjo as well as Kgalema Motlanthe as mediators in peace talks (Reuters, 2025 c).

These are complemented by the United Nations support in processes such as disarmament, demobilization, as well as reintegration where the ex-fighting forces can be reintegrated in civilian life but at the same time avoid the recurrence of conflict as well (United Nations Peacekeeping,

n.d.). Somalia saw the UN Security Council authorizing the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia in December of 2024 with an upper limit of 12,626 troops so that Somalia can hold al-Shabaab in check as well as stabilize the region as a whole (Ali, 2025).

Beyond security, there has been a strong post-COVID-19 focus on strengthening institutional capacity across Africa. Development partners, philanthropy, and African stakeholders have organised webinars and policy dialogues to learn from each other and generate proposals for strengthening African led institutions (African Development Bank & African Development Bank Group, 2021).

One prominent example of this type of approach is the work of Connected Development in Nigeria. Through initiatives such as “Follow the money”, CODE has enabled local communities to pursue accountability and transparency from their governments. These space to ensure that the voices of historically excluded populations are heard and, importantly, reflected in national policy and action (Follow the Money, n.d.).

Conclusion. The nature of African conflicts is characterized by complexity and multilevelness, shaped by factors such as political instability, socio-economic inequality, ethnic conflicts and competition for natural resources. Analysis of current trends confirms the views of previous researchers that traditional approaches to conflict resolution are insufficient due to their inability to capture the full complexity of the interaction of these factors.

Effective conflict resolution requires comprehensive, systemic solutions that combine political, economic and social strategies. It is important to take into account not only the national, but also the local context. Coordinated infrastructure and integration initiatives can contribute to reducing tensions and strengthening peace, but their effectiveness is limited by insufficient funding and the long-term consequences of past conflicts.

Ensuring stability in the region is possible only if conflict-sensitive approaches are integrated into public policy, developing effective governance and strengthening institutional resilience. Further efforts should be directed at interrelated solutions to the issues of peacebuilding, adaptation to change, and regional integration, which will create the prerequisites for sustainable development throughout the African continent.

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