

Methodology for studying interrelations between economic development strategising and behavioural decision models

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Abstract. The relevance of the topic stems from the fact that, in turbulent, institutionally fragmented and digitally mediated environments, the quality of strategic decisions depends not only on formal goal-setting and resource-allocation procedures, but also on the ways in which actors perceived information, risks, institutional constraints and algorithmic decision-support tools. The purpose of the paper was to construct an integrated methodological design capable of linking the normative logic of strategising with behavioural, institutional, analytical-modelling and adaptive-digital dimensions of decision-making. The study applied systems analysis, structural-component analysis, comparative analysis, institutional analysis, behavioural-cognitive interpretation, critical literature review, conceptual modelling and multilevel analytical interpretation. The article substantiated a methodology for studying the interrelations between economic development strategising and behavioural decision models. As a result, an integrated methodology was proposed in which strategising was interpreted as a cycle connecting goals, data, analytical models, co-ordination procedures, implementation, monitoring and adaptation. The study showed that real strategic decisions cannot be explained through rational choice alone and have to account for bounded rationality, cognitive biases, heterogeneous levels of reasoning, institutional incentives and the effects of algorithmic mediation. It was also demonstrated that the methodology has to be multilevel: at the national level, the emphasis is placed on uncertainty and long-term consequences; at the regional level, on programme co-ordination and resource design; and at the micro level, on behavioural mechanisms shaping implementation. The practical value of the study lies in the applicability of the proposed methodology to the design of economic development strategies, management architectures, monitoring systems and adaptive decision mechanisms in public administration and digital governance

Keywords: policy architecture; bounded rationality; institutional co-ordination; uncertainty governance; algorithmic mediation; procedural legitimacy

● INTRODUCTION

Economic development strategising has remained a central concern of management and public governance because contemporary economies have operated under turbulence, institutional fragmentation, technological acceleration and persistently incomplete information. Under such conditions, strategic decisions have affected not only the allocation of resources and priorities but also the resilience of governance systems, the credibility of public interventions and the capacity to adapt to unexpected shocks. This made

the methodological design of strategising research a substantive issue in its own right rather than a merely technical preliminary step.

Recent research has shown that strategic planning retained value in turbulent settings only when it functioned as an organisational capability rather than as a formal planning ritual. Å. Johnsen (2023) demonstrated that strategic planning remained useful in volatile environments, yet its contribution depended on how planning was linked

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to implementation and learning. L. Vandersmissen & B. George (2024a; 2024b) likewise showed, on the basis of a long-run review of public-sector scholarship, that the field had gradually shifted from a document-centred understanding of planning towards process, alignment and performance mechanisms. K. Axelsson & L. Höglund (2024) further confirmed that strategic management mattered when it structured cross-functional co-ordination and translated strategic intent into operational choices. These studies collectively suggested that the methodological analysis of strategising had to focus on process architecture rather than on planning formalities alone.

A second line of research established that strategic outcomes could not be inferred from formal plans without accounting for behavioural processes. A. Giarlotta & A. Petralia (2024) revisited bounded rationality and reaffirmed its continuing importance for economics and management, showing that limited cognition and satisficing remained central to real-world decision-making. M. Mozafar *et al.* (2023), in a systematic review of behavioural public policy, showed that framing, simplification, defaults, salience and social norms systematically altered how policy choices were perceived and implemented. B.D. Chol *et al.* (2026) reached a related conclusion in behavioural public administration, arguing that cognitive biases, motivational factors and institutional context had to be analysed jointly rather than in isolation. This literature indicated that a methodology of strategising had to connect priorities and instruments with choice, learning, resistance and adaptation.

A third stream of scholarship highlighted uncertainty and digital mediation as conditions that reconfigured strategic decision-making itself. R. Akse (2024) showed that uncertainty was governed through competencies, expectations and rules rather than treated as a purely technical deficit, while A. Batool *et al.* (2025) demonstrated that artificial intelligence governance required explainability, accountability and adaptive oversight. Taken together, these findings revealed a persistent research gap: studies on strategic management, behavioural decision-making, uncertainty management and digital transformation often advanced in parallel, whereas economic development strategies were implemented through one interdependent decision system in which goals, incentives, data, expectations and governance routines continuously interacted.

The aim of this article was to substantiate a methodology for studying the interrelations between economic development strategising and behavioural decision models. The objectives were threefold: to clarify the analytical dimensions of strategising; to compare behavioural, institutional and digital mechanisms that conditioned strategic decision-making; and to construct a multilevel methodological architecture suitable for the analysis of economic development. The scientific novelty of the paper lay in combining strategic, behavioural, institutional and digital lenses into one coherent analytical design.

● MATERIALS AND METHODS

The article was designed as a theoretical and review-based study aimed at reconstructing a methodology for analysing the interrelations between economic development strategising and behavioural decision models. Its empirical base

consisted of contemporary peer-reviewed scholarship on strategic planning, behavioural public policy, public administration, digital government, uncertainty management and algorithmic decision-making. The corpus was delimited primarily to publications from the last three to five years so that the proposed methodology reflected current debates on public governance, digital transformation and behavioural economics while remaining conceptually connected to the broader strategic-management tradition. The unit of analysis was not an individual organisation or dataset, but published analytical arguments, conceptual constructs and explanatory mechanisms relevant to multilevel strategising.

The review and synthesis procedure was organised in five stages. First, the literature was grouped into four analytical clusters: strategic planning and strategic management; bounded rationality and behavioural public policy; uncertainty and adaptive governance; and digital and algorithmic decision-making. Second, the selected works were compared according to their unit of analysis, causal logic, treatment of actors, treatment of uncertainty and practical implications for public and economic governance. Third, recurring dimensions were extracted and classified into strategic, behavioural, institutional, informational-analytical and adaptive-digital dimensions. Fourth, a dedicated stage of methodological mapping was introduced in order to connect these dimensions with plausible analytical instruments. This stage produced the heuristic matrix presented in Table 1. The matrix was therefore treated not as a direct empirical result but as a recommendatory synthesis showing which methodological tools were most consistent with specific classes of strategic and behavioural problems. Fifth, the resulting dimensions and mappings were integrated into the conceptual scheme represented in Figure 1.

Several methods were combined within this design. Systems analysis was used to interpret strategising as a set of interacting decision loops rather than as a linear administrative sequence. Structural-component analysis made it possible to distinguish the principal blocks of the framework and to specify their internal functions. Comparative analysis was applied to identify convergences and divergences among recent studies, especially in their causal assumptions about how planning, incentives, cognition, uncertainty and digital mediation influenced outcomes. Conceptual modelling was used to reconstruct the internal logic linking strategic parameters with behavioural mechanisms and to express this logic in a multilevel form suitable for national, regional and micro-level analysis. Critical literature review was used not merely to summarise previous research but to evaluate whether existing findings confirmed, refined or challenged the core theses advanced in the present article.

A separate analytical dimension concerned explainability and procedural fairness in algorithmic governance. Because the literature showed that digital mediation could alter not only analytical efficiency but also legitimacy, fairness and acceptance, explainability was included explicitly in the methodological design rather than left as an implicit derivative of digitalisation. In practical terms, this meant that the review tracked how studies conceptualised the visibility of algorithmic logic, the accountability of automated recommendations, the role of public engagement and the

institutional conditions under which algorithmic support was accepted or resisted. This step justified the later inclusion of adaptive-digital variables and the discussion of procedural legitimacy in the results section.

The operational logic of the methodology was multilevel and nested rather than based on a single homogeneous dataset. Macro-level strategic variables, meso-level co-ordination variables and micro-level behavioural variables were not assumed to be measured simultaneously through one instrument. Instead, the methodology specified which variables could be examined at which level and through which method, thereby avoiding the false expectation that cognitive biases and strategic parameters had to be captured in one empirical table. This multilevel nesting also explained why some instruments in Table 1 were presented as indicative options rather than obligatory techniques. The purpose of the article was thus analytical integration and methodological clarification, not statistical generalisation or direct causal estimation.

● RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The comparative stage of the study showed that the reviewed literature converged on one point while differing in its causal emphasis. Strategic-planning studies explained outcomes primarily through alignment, implementation routines and co-ordination structures. Behavioural studies explained them through bounded rationality, framing, attention limits and motivational context. Uncertainty-oriented studies emphasised the instability of assumptions, the revisability of indicators and the need for adaptive safeguards. Digital-governance studies focused on explainability, legitimacy and the redistribution of interpretive authority through algorithmic systems. These clusters therefore did not contradict one another; rather, they illuminated different mechanisms through which strategising succeeded or failed.

This comparison made it possible to reconstruct the internal causal logic of the proposed methodology. Strategic parameters shaped what counted as relevant objectives and feasible trade-offs. Institutional settings influenced how those objectives were translated into authority,

co-ordination and accountability structures. Behavioural mechanisms affected how actors interpreted information, prioritised alternatives and responded to incentives. Informational-analytical routines determined which signals became visible and which remained excluded from managerial attention. Adaptive-digital arrangements conditioned how quickly feedback was incorporated and whether algorithmic support strengthened or weakened legitimacy. In this sense, the methodology linked outcomes not to a single factor but to a chain of mutually conditioning relations.

Methodologically, these dimensions should be translated into observable or at least traceable indicators through a nested research design. Strategic variables may be examined through priority density, horizon length, resource concentration and explicit trade-off rules in policy documents. Behavioural variables may be studied through risk preferences, heuristic reliance, tolerance for ambiguity, trust and perceptions of procedural legitimacy, but they should be examined at the level where such evidence can be credibly observed, for example through surveys, experiments, process tracing or administrative diagnostics. Institutional variables may be traced through distributions of authority, formal accountability rules, co-ordination burdens and procedural rigidity. Informational-analytical variables may be assessed through data timeliness, scenario diversity, model transparency and monitoring frequency. Adaptive-digital variables may be analysed through explainability, the pace of revision, the degree of algorithmic support and the formal status of automated recommendations. This clarified that macro-level strategic parameters and micro-level behavioural mechanisms were not expected to be measured through one instrument; they were connected analytically within one multilevel framework. To make this logic operational, Table 1 presents an illustrative mapping between major strategising parameters, recurrent behavioural mechanisms, their developmental implications and the methodological options most appropriate for their identification. The table should be read as a heuristic and recommendatory device derived from the comparative synthesis, not as an empirical finding based on a single dataset.

Table 1. Correspondence between economic development strategising parameters and behavioural decision-making mechanisms

Strategising parameters	Behavioural mechanisms and biases	Implications for economic development	Illustrative methodological options
Goals and priorities	framing effect, loss aversion, overconfidence	formation of unrealistic or politically driven goals; strategic imbalances	content analysis of strategic documents; expert coding; scenario analysis
Resource provision and budgeting	mental accounting, present bias	reorientation towards short-term results; underfunding of long-term development programmes	medium-term expenditure analysis; programme-budget comparison; expenditure tracking
Institutional mechanisms	trust/distrust, risk aversion, perception of uncertainty	reduced investment activity; expansion of shadow practices; limitations in institutional capacity	institutional indices; macroeconometric modelling; analysis of regulatory quality
Implementation and co-ordination	status quo bias, limited attention	implementation delays; lack of co-ordination; imitation of policy implementation	process tracing; implementation diagnostics; administrative process analytics
Monitoring and adjustment	confirmation bias, escalation of commitment	persistence of ineffective policies; delayed or absent policy adjustment	monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems; ex post policy evaluation; analysis of alternative hypotheses

Source: compiled by the author

The correspondence presented in Table 1 shows that strategic errors should be interpreted as systematic interactions between classes of strategising parameters and recurrent behavioural mechanisms. It also clarifies that the proposed methodological toolkit is selective rather than universal: its function is to guide the choice of methods according to the level and nature of the problem under study, not to prescribe one uniform design for all cases of economic development strategising.

On the basis of the literature synthesis, the proposed framework contains six structural components. The goal-setting component defines the hierarchy of strategic objectives, the relationship between long-term orientation and medium-term programmes, and the criteria of trade-off resolution. The analytical component converts raw information into interpretable evidence through indicators, diagnostics, scenarios, and models. The behavioural component captures how decision-makers and target groups interpret signals, assess risk, and choose among alternatives under cognitive and emotional constraints. The institutional component formalises roles, authority, accountability, and procedures of co-ordination. The implementation component translates selected decisions into operational programmes, routines, and organisational action. The feedback and adaptation component evaluates outcomes, detects deviations, and supports correction.

This six-component architecture clarifies why strategic failure is often misdiagnosed. In many settings, failure is attributed either to incorrect policy ideas or to poor implementation. The framework developed here shows that failure may emerge at any interface: between goals and data, between data and interpretation, between interpretation and institutional selection, or between implementation and learning. A methodologically adequate study must

therefore examine not only decisions themselves but also the channels through which they are produced, legitimised, translated, and revised.

A key contribution of the framework was the placement of behavioural mechanisms inside, rather than outside, the strategic process. Behavioural effects did not arise only at the stage of citizen response or organisational resistance; they also affected agenda-setting, metric selection, prioritisation, scenario evaluation and monitoring. Overconfidence could distort target-setting, present bias could weaken long-term commitments, status quo bias could delay adjustment, and confirmation bias could reduce corrective learning. This explained why formally consistent strategies often remained practically weak.

A useful way to interpret these components is through classes of strategic error and their causal transmission. Goal-setting errors emerged when priorities became over-extended or detached from feasible implementation horizons. Analytical errors emerged when indicators were poorly selected or when a single model was treated as if it exhausted uncertainty. Behavioural errors emerged when decision-makers underestimated inertia, overestimated compliance or assumed a shared cognitive map across actors. Institutional errors emerged when responsibility was fragmented or co-ordination costs ignored. Implementation errors appeared when operational routines did not translate strategic intent into action, whereas feedback errors appeared when monitoring captured outputs but missed adaptive capacity. This causal differentiation made the framework diagnostic rather than merely descriptive. Figure 1 integrates the proposed methodological logic into one analytical scheme and shows how strategising parameters, behavioural decision models and multilevel implementation were linked through a unified decision architecture.




Figure 1. Logical-structural framework of the research methodology for the relationship between economic development strategising parameters and behavioural decision-making models

Source: compiled by the author

As summarised in Figure 1, the methodology should be interpreted as a connected process rather than a linear sequence of isolated procedures. In this scheme, the effectiveness of economic development strategising refers to a combined outcome: developmental effects in the form of more coherent priorities, better implementation and stronger adaptive capacity, together with procedural quality expressed through accountability, explainability and the legitimacy of decision-making routines.

The framework was explicitly multilevel. At the national level, strategising dealt with high uncertainty, long implementation horizons and structurally incomplete information. Here the methodological emphasis was placed on scenario construction, model pluralism, robustness analysis and institutionalised revision of assumptions. Long-lag effects meant that even analytically justified choices required adaptive safeguards. At this level, the greatest risks arose from oversimplified models of the environment, weak anticipation of agent responses and insufficient attention to systemic feedback.

At the regional level, the central challenge was translation. National priorities had to be transformed into programme portfolios, investment packages and governance arrangements compatible with local capabilities and constraints. Therefore, the methodology had to emphasise co-ordination, prioritisation, inter-organisational alignment and resource design. Regional strategising was especially vulnerable to composition errors: goals might be formally aligned with national policy but poorly synchronised with implementation capacity, institutional incentives or stakeholder expectations.

At the micro level, the problem shifted towards operational behaviour. Firms, service units, local authorities and frontline public organisations responded to strategies through routines, heuristics, learning patterns and selective compliance. The methodological focus therefore had to move to implementation behaviour, practical incentives, organisational attention and the dynamics of feedback. In this sense, micro-level analysis was not a reduced or secondary layer of strategising; it was the level at which strategic logic was confirmed, adapted or silently neutralised by real decision behaviour.

The multilevel perspective also helped distinguish the dominant time structure of decision-making. National strategies usually operated with long-range causal assumptions and delayed outcomes, so the methodology had to remain robust to model uncertainty and structural breaks. Regional strategies combined medium-term programming with negotiation among multiple implementers, which made co-ordination, sequencing and portfolio balance analytically central. Micro-level strategies, by contrast, were shaped by short feedback loops, frontline discretion and local routines, so observation of actual behaviour became especially important. This difference in temporal architecture explained why the same formal strategic priority might produce different outcomes across levels even when it was nominally preserved.

The framework also clarified how digital transformation modified strategising. Artificial intelligence and digital government tools expanded the analytical capacity of organisations by accelerating diagnosis, pattern detection and scenario generation. However, they simultaneously

altered the behavioural and institutional conditions under which decisions were accepted. Digital systems influenced who saw what information, how options were ranked, how quickly correction occurred and whether procedural fairness was perceived as legitimate. Therefore, the methodological study of strategising could not treat digital tools as neutral technical add-ons.

A particularly important implication concerned explainability and acceptance. Where algorithmic decision support was rule-driven and contextually familiar, decision-makers and citizens tended to perceive it as fairer and more legitimate. Where data-driven systems were opaque, the same efficiency gains could produce distrust, resistance or selective avoidance. In strategic terms, this meant that digital augmentation improved decision quality only when technical sophistication was matched by institutional accountability and behavioural acceptability. The practical lesson for economic development strategising was that digital infrastructure, analytical models and governance routines had to be designed together rather than sequentially.

The same conclusion applied to the use of intelligent systems in strategic foresight and policy co-ordination. Digitalisation enabled higher-frequency data collection, simulation and pattern recognition, but it also raised the risk of false precision. A methodologically sound strategy framework therefore had to combine model-based analysis with explicit reflection on uncertainty, data bias, interpretive limits and the social conditions of implementation. In other words, algorithmic capacity could strengthen strategising only if it was embedded in a reflexive governance architecture.

For economic development policy, this insight had immediate consequences. If digital dashboards, automated scoring systems or predictive tools were introduced without clarifying their institutional status, they could silently shift decision rights from accountable actors to opaque procedural defaults. Conversely, when digital tools were explicitly embedded in review procedures, combined with transparent criteria and supplemented by human judgement, they could improve the speed and coherence of strategic correction. Methodologically, researchers therefore had to examine not only whether digital tools were present but also how they redistributed attention, responsibility and interpretive authority inside the strategising process.

For researchers, the proposed framework offered a way to operationalise the relationship between strategising and decision-making without reducing one to the other. It enabled the design of empirical studies that tested specific interfaces, such as the link between risk perception and prioritisation, or between monitoring routines and adaptive correction. It also created a basis for combining qualitative inquiry, econometric modelling, process tracing, simulation and comparative institutional analysis within one coherent research design.

For practitioners, the framework highlighted several design principles. First, strategic documents had to be evaluated not only by the clarity of objectives but also by the realism of the behavioural assumptions built into them. Second, monitoring systems had to track deviations in implementation behaviour, not just deviations in target

indicators. Third, adaptive revision procedures had to be formalised in advance rather than activated only after visible failure. Fourth, digital tools had to be selected according to both analytical usefulness and procedural legitimacy. When these conditions were met, strategising became less a formal planning exercise and more a structured capability for co-ordinated, evidence-informed and behaviourally realistic development management.

The framework was also compatible with mixed-method research designs. Comparative case studies could identify how similar strategic documents performed differently under distinct institutional and behavioural conditions. Survey and experimental methods could test how managers, experts and citizens responded to alternative framing of priorities, risks and algorithmic support tools. Econometric and panel-data approaches could estimate whether strategic capacity, digitalisation or accountability structures affected implementation outcomes over time. Process tracing could reconstruct how specific strategic choices were formed and revised. Simulation models could then test how heterogeneous agents reacted under alternative governance settings. This complementarity was particularly valuable for doctoral-level and policy-oriented research, where explanation, measurement and design often needed to be combined.

A final implication concerned the normative interpretation of strategising. In economic development debates, strategic coherence was often treated as a sign of policy quality. The present analysis suggested a more demanding criterion: a strategy was methodologically strong only when its internal logic was behaviourally realistic, institutionally executable, analytically revisable and digitally accountable. This criterion did not reject formal planning; it redefined planning as one element of a broader decision system. In that sense, the proposed framework supported a move from document-centred assessment towards architecture-centred assessment of economic development strategies.

The proposed methodology should also be compared with studies that examine decision-making in more concrete empirical settings. This comparison is useful because the same methodological problem appears in different forms depending on the context of action. A.A. Ahiadu *et al.* (2024) showed that investment decisions under economic uncertainty were shaped by risk perception, market expectations and financial conditions. C.M. Cumpăt *et al.* (2024), in the case of public hospitals, demonstrated that managerial choice depended on resource constraints, information availability and administrative routines. G. Sun *et al.* (2023) linked stakeholder behaviour in public-private partnerships to benefit distribution, strategic expectations and incentive configurations. These studies do not analyse economic development strategising as such, but they confirm that strategic decisions cannot be reduced to formal choice. They are formed at the intersection of uncertainty, organisational constraints and expectations regarding the behaviour of other actors.

This comparison specifies the multilevel logic of the article. At the national level, uncertainty is linked mainly to the instability of assumptions, long-term consequences and the need to revise indicators when the environment changes, which is close to the argument of A. Medne *et*

al. (2022) on sustainable strategy development under uncertainty. In sectoral and organisational settings, the same problem appears through resource limitations, administrative routines and stakeholder bargaining. At the micro level, it becomes visible through risk perception, selective compliance and heterogeneous reactions to incentives. Therefore, the proposed methodology does not replace sector-specific explanations. It arranges comparable decision mechanisms within one analytical sequence: goal-setting, institutional co-ordination, implementation, monitoring and adaptive correction.

The digital dimension follows the same methodological logic. G. Caiza *et al.* (2024) showed that artificial intelligence in governmental decision-making could increase analytical capacity while also creating risks of bias, opacity and accountability gaps. E. Papagiannidis *et al.* (2023) linked AI governance to organisational practices and governance arrangements, while Y. Gong & X. Yang (2024) examined digital government transformation as dependent on configurations of actors, institutional conditions and transformation stages. E. Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi (2024) interpreted digital governance through the interaction of humans, machines and organisations. These arguments are consistent with the position of this article; however, the present article applies this argument specifically to strategising: algorithmic tools are considered as elements of strategising because they change not only how information is processed, but also how responsibility, legitimacy and feedback are organised within the strategic decision cycle.

This is why the methodological framework includes not only analytical capacity, but also procedural legitimacy. G. Wang *et al.* (2023) found that rule-driven and data-driven algorithmic systems are perceived differently in terms of fairness and acceptability. M.C. Decker *et al.* (2025) emphasised that procedural fairness depends on public engagement and the social conditions under which algorithmic decisions are assessed. S. Sharma *et al.* (2024) similarly demonstrated that digital participation becomes meaningful only when accountability and the quality of participation are ensured. For economic development strategising, this means that monitoring and correction cannot be treated as technical operations only. They also depend on explainability, acceptance and the perceived legitimacy of decision procedures.

The role of feedback is also clarified by studies on agility, crisis decision-making and collective cognition. H. Looks *et al.* (2024) associated public-sector agility with iterative learning and feedback capacity. I. D'Alessio *et al.* (2024) demonstrated that emergency contexts make adaptive and multi-actor governance especially visible. Z. Kowalczyk & M. Czubenko (2023) argued that intelligent decision-making systems required explicit cognitive foundations, whereas A.N. Tump *et al.* (2024) proposed a cognitive-computational view of social and collective decision-making. These studies differ in their empirical domains, but they point to a common conclusion relevant to this article: decision quality depends on the interaction of cognition, institutional rules, information flows and feedback mechanisms. The contribution of the proposed methodology is therefore to connect these elements within a methodological architecture for analysing economic development strategising.

● CONCLUSIONS

This article substantiated a methodology for studying the interrelations between economic development strategising and behavioural decision models. The study showed that the explanatory power of strategising research increased when the normative logic of goals, priorities and resource allocation was analysed together with bounded rationality, cognitive heterogeneity, institutional constraints, uncertainty management and algorithmic mediation. In methodological terms, the paper demonstrated that strategic decisions had to be interpreted not as isolated acts of formal choice but as cyclical and multilevel processes in which information, incentives, routines and behavioural responses interacted over time.

The article also showed that a viable methodology required explicit differentiation between levels of analysis and classes of variables. National-level strategising demanded attention to uncertainty, long time horizons and the revisability of assumptions; regional strategising demanded attention to programme co-ordination, portfolio balance and resource design; and micro-level strategising demanded attention to implementation behaviour, incentives, attention limits and practical feedback loops. By specifying a nested rather than a single-instrument design, the study clarified how macro-level strategic parameters and micro-level behavioural mechanisms could be analysed within one framework without collapsing them into a misleadingly uniform dataset.

A further contribution of the paper lay in demonstrating that digital transformation and algorithmic support had to be integrated into the methodology as substantive analytical dimensions. The study showed that digital tools influenced not only the speed of diagnosis and scenario generation but also the explainability, legitimacy and procedural fairness of decision-making. For that reason, the effectiveness of strategising was defined in the article as a combined outcome that included developmental results, implementation coherence, adaptive capacity and procedural quality. The practical value of the proposed methodology therefore lay in its applicability to the design of economic development strategies, management architectures, monitoring systems and adaptive decision mechanisms in public administration and digital governance. Future research should test the framework in comparative, sectoral and regional settings, as well as develop operational indicators and mixed-method designs for measuring the interaction between strategic parameters and behavioural mechanisms.

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Методологія дослідження взаємозв'язку стратегування економічного розвитку та поведінкових моделей рішень

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Анотація. Актуальність теми зумовлена тим, що в умовах турбулентного, інституційно фрагментованого та цифровізованого середовища якості стратегічних рішень визначається не лише формальними процедурами цілепокладання і розподілу ресурсів, а й тим, як суб'єкти сприймають інформацію, ризики, інституційні обмеження та алгоритмічні інструменти підтримки вибору. Метою роботи було сформувати цілісну методологічну конструкцію, здатну поєднати нормативний контур стратегування з поведінковим, інституційним, аналітико-модельним та цифрово-адаптивним контуром прийняття рішень. У дослідженні було використано системний, структурно-компонентний, порівняльний, інституційний та поведінково-когнітивний підходи, а також методи критичного огляду літератури, концептуального моделювання, проблемно-логічного структурування і багаторівневої аналітичної інтерпретації. У статті було обґрунтовано методологію дослідження взаємозв'язку між стратегуванням економічного розвитку та поведінковими моделями прийняття рішень. У результаті було запропоновано інтегровану методологію, в якій стратегування інтерпретувалося як цикл взаємодії цілей, даних, аналітичних моделей, процедур узгодження, реалізації, моніторингу та адаптації. Було показано, що пояснення реальних стратегічних рішень вимагає врахування обмеженої раціональності, когнітивних викривлень, неоднорідності рівнів мислення, інституційних стимулів та ефектів алгоритмічної mediaції. Також було доведено, що методологія має будуватися як багаторівнева: на національному рівні акцент було зроблено на роботі з невизначеністю та довгими горизонтами наслідків, на регіональному – на координації програм і ресурсному дизайні, на мікрорівні – на поведінкових механізмах реалізації. Практична цінність роботи полягає у можливості використання запропонованої методології для побудови стратегій економічного розвитку, архітектури управлінських процедур, систем моніторингу та адаптивних механізмів прийняття рішень у публічному управлінні й цифровому середовищі

Ключові слова: архітектура політики; обмежена раціональність; інституційна координація; управління невизначеністю; алгоритмічна mediaція; процедурна легітимність